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SUMMARY 
 
     A reexamination of historic data for Pacific-wide tsunamis suggests the need for 
modeling the effects of potential “100-year 9.0 magnitude earthquakes” from the Western 
and Southwestern Pacific, and possibly from Japan.  Such modeling would either confirm 
the reliability of existing evacuation maps for the Hawaiian Islands or indicate necessary 
modifications.  Long term observations of human responses to tsunamis in Hawaii, and 
more recently in Asia, suggest that tsunami education should be required in public and 
private schools.  Destructive local tsunamis generated by small, unfelt earthquakes have 
struck, and will strike, portions of the Big Island without warning unless detectors similar 
to those protecting the Kona Coast are installed.  Government and business leaders need 
to continually be reminded of the destructive potential of tsunamis, as well as the 
limitations and requirements of the warning system.  Finally, critical infrastructure should 
be hardened to prevent damage from salt water flooding so as to facilitate a more rapid 
recovery from inevitable future tsunamis. 
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     Several  key  elements  are  now  generally recognized as contributing factors in the 
tragedies of the Asian tsunami.  Among these are the absence of a warning system for the 
Indian Ocean, failure to accurately assess the risks associated with tsunamis in the Indian 
Ocean, the absence of a general understanding of the characteristics and destructive 
potential of tsunamis, little or no timely intergovernmental communications, no existing 
evacuation plans, and possibly little or no zoning or engineering requirements to protect 
structures and critical lifeline facilities.  Steps are now being taken by Asian countries 
and the international community to address some, if not all, of these issues.  Perhaps the 
single greatest lesson to be learned from this tragedy is, once again, the failure of 
scientists and government agencies to analyze situations critically and objectively so as to 
eliminate any biases favoring desirable conclusions.  As an example, thinking prior to 26 
December 2004 might have been that recorded history provided no evidence of an ocean-
wide tsunami in the Indian Ocean, so such a phenomenon seemed unlikely to happen.  
Furthermore, even if such an event were to occur, it would more than likely be a small 
tsunami.  Therefore, concerning the local population and visitors with such an 
unreasonable possibility would be unnecessary and unwise.  Thus, one would arrive at an 
acceptable, desirable, but horribly wrong conclusion.  In an effort to avoid somewhat 
similar mistakes, the assessments that follow are offered as critical and objective 
evaluations of the current status of Hawaii’s tsunami preparedness. 
 
EVALUATIONS 
 
An Asian Type Tsunami in Hawaii  
 
     In the 20
th century, the Hawaiian Islands have been struck by several large Pacific-
wide tsunamis.  Moment magnitudes (Mw) and runups for these events are given in 
Walker (2000).  The largest magnitudes are 9.6 (Chile ’60), 9.2 (Alaska ’64), 9.0 
(Kamchatka ’52), 8.7 (Aleutians ’65), and 8.6 (Aleutians ’57). [The Mw of the 
Indonesian earthquake west of Sumatra that produced the Asian tsunami is reported to be 
9.0.  Hereafter, all magnitudes cited in this report, unless otherwise indicated, will be 
moment magnitudes.]  With some of the largest earthquakes in recorded history among 
those above, along with other destructive tsunamis including the powerful and anomalous 
1946 event (Mw = 8.0), “worst case” scenarios may have already been experienced in the 
Hawaiian Islands.  Also, with an existing warning system in the Pacific, it would seem 
improbable that Hawaii could be “surprised” by a tsunami from a 9.0 earthquake. 
However, a more careful examination of the data reveals that Hawaii’s experience with 
large ocean-wide tsunamis is limited to source areas from the circum-Pacific arc 
extending from Japan through Alaska and from the west coast of South America.  Since 
other portions of the circum-Pacific arc have not generated significant tsunamis in Hawaii 
(i.e., greater than or equal to 1 meter), does that mean that none will be generated?  Isn’t 
this the same type of “logic” that contributed to the Asian tragedy? Perhaps. It may be 
reasonable to dismiss large portions of the circum-Pacific arc because of the nature of 
faulting (e.g., the prevalent horizontal strike-slip motions along the west coast of North 
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and margins of the Pacific plate extending south of Tonga).  Remaining portions of the 
circum-Pacific arc extend south from Japan to New Guinea and continue eastward to 
Tonga and Samoa (Figure 1).  These predominately vertical subducting margins have 
many segments oriented towards Hawaii.  Although large locally destructive tsunamis 
frequently occur in some of these regions, there is no record of significant Pacific-wide 
propagation for the regions shown other than for Japan.  In view of the Asian tragedies, a 
more careful analysis of these seemingly benign portions of the Pacific may be 
appropriate.                                                                                                     
          The question to be asked is whether these regions have been benign in terms of 
significant Pacific-wide tsunamis because of a deficiency of large earthquakes or because 
of attenuation by the large number of extensive island groups (e.g., the Caroline, 
Marshall, Gilbert, Ellis, and Phoenix groups) to the east and north of some of these 
regions.  In this investigation the magnitudes of  large earthquakes are examined for 
differing regions of subducting margins to the west and southwest of Hawaii - generally 
extending from south of Japan to New Guinea and eastward through to Tonga and 
Samoa. To find the origin times of these earthquakes, searches were made of U. S. 
Geological Survey on-line data bases.  Only earthquakes with either body wave, surface 
wave, or moment magnitudes of 7.0 or greater and focal depths of less than 100 km were 
used.  Also, foreshocks and aftershocks were excluded.  With the “Significant Worldwide 
Earthquakes (2150 B.C - 1994 A.D.)” data base, the only earthquakes found for the 
regions of interest occurred in the 20
th century with most of the magnitudes being based 
only on surface waves from a variety of different sources.  Substantially more magnitudes 
based on seismic moments were found in the “USGS/NEIC (PDE) 1973 - Present” data 
base.  However, to give meaning to this study, uniformly computed moment magnitudes 
are needed for as much of the time period as possible.  To achieve this requirement, 
comprehensive reevaluations of seismic moments for historic earthquakes provided in the 
1900 though 1989 catalog of Pacheco and Sykes (1992) were used.  A formulation given 
in Hanks and Kanamori (1979) was then applied to convert seismic moments to moment 
magnitudes.  For moment magnitudes subsequent to 1989, Harvard values, if available, 
were used (25 earthquakes). The remaining 6 values of the 113 shown in Table 1 are 
USGS moment magnitudes. [Regarding the moment magnitudes already cited in this 
report, the Indonesian value was from Harvard and all others were from Pacheco and 
Sykes (1992).]                                                                                                      
     It is well known that earthquake magnitude is merely an indicator of tsunamigenic 
potential rather than an essential determinant of a tsunami’s destructive power.  Critical 
factors are the displacement of the ocean floor and the transmission efficiency to 
potential runup sites.  All of the five earthquakes along the margins of the Pacific with 
magnitudes of 8.6 or greater in the 20
th century generated significant tsunamis in Hawaii 
(Fig 2; Walker, 2000).  However, for magnitudes of 8.0 to 8.5, only 6 of 31 earthquakes 
generated significant tsunamis in Hawaii.  Thus, the data in Table 1 indicates a 
substantial deficiency of large earthquakes capable of generating significant Pacific-wide 
tsunamis.  The question remains as to whether attenuation by islands would block the 
transmission of an Asian-type 9.0 Mw tsunami from these regions into other areas of the 
Pacific.  The low magnitudes of Table 1 might suggest that such large events are unlikely 
and an investigation of the extent of “9.0 Mw tsunami attenuation” is unwarranted.   
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Table 1, described as “West of New Guinea”, is indeed far to the west of New Guinea.  In 
fact, this region encompasses the subducting margins under, and adjacent to, Sumatra 
(the search grid used was 15 N to 15 S and 90 E to 105 E).  The only magnitude excluded 
from Table 1 for this region is the 9.0 of 26 December 2004.  The fact that for a span of 
more than 100 years the next largest magnitudes were only two 7.9’s is disturbing, to say 
the least!                                                                           
          In terms of tsunamigenic potential as evidenced only by earthquake magnitudes,   
Table 1 indicates the western and southwestern margins of the Pacific Ocean may be as 
dangerous as the eastern margin of the Indian Ocean.  Thus the question of “island 
attenuation” transforms from a questionable academic exercise to a critical and urgently 
needed inquiry.  Modeling of a “100 year tsunami” (i.e., one generated by a 9.0 
earthquake) for differing regions of the Western and Southwestern Pacific will be needed 
to determine whether island chain attenuation would be substantial or whether a 
significant Pacific-wide tsunami would, in fact, be generated. If attenuation is not 
substantial, inundations in some areas, especially along the southern and western shores 
of Hawaii, could exceed historical values from tsunamis in the North Pacific and South 
America.  It should be noted that there are no island chains between Hawaii and the 
subducting margins south of Japan to Guam.  Also, the largest magnitude for tsunamis 
recorded in Hawaii from Japan is only an 8.4 (in 1933) suggesting that the effects on 
Hawaii of a tsunami generated by a 9.0 earthquake in Japan should also be modeled. 
 
Education 
 
     In addition to avoiding biases favoring acceptable, desirable, but potentially horribly 
wrong conclusions, an essential component of any successful warning system is 
education.  As has occurred with teachers and students at Laupahoehoe in 1946, residents 
of Hilo in 1960, and hundreds of surfers on Oahu’s north shore in 1994, curiosity, short-
term memories, and a failure to understand the nature and destructive power of tsunamis 
can undermine the effectiveness of any warning system.  To best overcome the realities 
of human nature, tsunami education should be institutionalized in public and private 
schools to ensure that children know the characteristics and destructive power of 
tsunamis, and to ensure that they and their teachers know what to do regardless of 
whether they are at school or elsewhere.  A small amount of time dedicated to this topic 
on siren test days could be an effective method for achieving this objective. 
 
Communications 
 
     Most aspects of communications are continually tested and upgraded by State and 
County Civil Defense agencies, as well as the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center.   
However, one perceived glaring deficiency in communications is likely unless corrective 
actions are taken.  Because of an absence of instrumentation along parts of the Puna and 
Kona coastline from Punaluu to Kapoho, a small unfelt earthquake could generate a 
highly localized but destructive tsunami along shorelines popular with residents and 
tourists (i.e., Punaluu, Pohoiki, and Ahalanui), and in coastal campground areas of the 
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a tsunami although some other shorelines at risk on the Big Island are instrumented with 
devices (i.e., along the Kona Coast from Honokohau to Milolii) that would detect such 
tsunamis and provide Civil Defense personnel with an opportunity to sound warning 
sirens.  History confirms that such a tsunami will occur (Walker and Cessaro, 2002).  
Instruments will have to be installed sooner or later.  Will this be done before or after 
such a tsunami?  If “after”, the public will ask why a technologically possible warning 
was not given to them - thus a major communications and credibility problem for State 
and County leaders, Civil Defense agencies, and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. 
 
Warnings 
 
     Potential  problems  with  warnings  are  related  to  instrumentation,  education,  and 
communication issues.  Until data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s tsunami buoys, or from some other as yet undiscovered methodology, 
has a substantial history of success, warnings perceived as “false” by the public are 
always a possibility.  People of Hawaii need to understand the limitations of our warning 
system.  They need to know that once the reliability of data used in the warning system is 
established, false warnings will be reduced or eliminated.  Also, for some warnings only 
limited evacuations may be required (Walker, 2004) resulting in a substantial reduction in 
business losses to our economy.  Not only does Hawaii have a warning system for 
Pacific-wide tsunamis but, as has already been mentioned, a warning system for locally 
generated tsunamis for part of the Big Island.  This system also provides an early warning 
for the rest of the State should a large tsunami occur on the Kona Coast.  Historical data 
and the successful operation of the tsunami sensors on the Kona Coast suggest that local 
warning criteria should be reviewed to eliminate overcautious, and obviously false, local 
warnings. Also, some criteria might be eliminated so that warnings can be called more 
quickly.  Necessary upgrades and expansions of the local warning system should be 
made.  The people of Hawaii need to understand the differences and characteristics of 
both Pacific-wide and local warnings.  
 
Infrastructure 
 
     There may be no justification for the destruction of critical facilities by salt water 
flooding.  In some areas most of the potential flooding damage will be the result of a 
gradual increase in water level rather than powerful horizontal surges. Earthen berms, 
sandbags, or waterproof doors could prevent much of this damage. In other areas more 
drastic protection may be required. Government agencies should be sure that such critical 
lifelines (i.e., electrical, water, sewage, fuel, communications, fire, police, and 
transportation) are “hardened” not only for tsunamis but also for hurricanes. These 
suggestions have previously been made for Hawaii, and generally ignored, in a U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers Report (1999). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
     The following recommendations should be urgently adopted as “action items” with 
strategies and timelines.  (1) Proactive government agencies should implement modeling 
to determine the effect on Hawaii of a “100-year 9.0 magnitude earthquake” from regions 
in the Western and Southwestern Pacific, including Japan.  (2) The local warning system 
should be expanded and upgraded.  (3) The State Department of Education and other 
educational institutions should be encouraged to implement standardized tsunami 
education in their schools.  (4) Warning criteria for local earthquakes should be reviewed.  
(5) If necessary, critical facilities managers should be made aware of tsunami hazards and 
be required to harden their facilities against salt water flooding.  (6) Finally, our 
government leaders need to understand the potential impact of tsunamis on our people 
and economy so as to minimize losses and speed recovery in the next large tsunami.  
Anything less than these actions and we will have learned little from the tragedies of 26 
December 2004. 
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Figure 1.  Subducting margins of the Western and Southwestern Pacific. Plot taken from 
the “USGS/NEIC (PDE) 1973 - Present” on-line data base for all magnitudes greater than 
or equal to 6.0. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Moment Magnitudes for Subducting Margins to the West and Southwest of 
Hawaii (1900 - 2004) for Earthquakes with Focal Depths of Less than 100 
Kilometers* 
 
                                              Region  Moment 
Magnitude  A B C D E F G H 
7.0  x x x  xxx  xxxx    xxx  x 
7.1  x x x  xx  xx  xxx  xxx   
7.2     x  xxx  x  xxxx  x 
7.3   xx  xx  xxx  x x  xx  x 
7.4 xxxx  xxx x    x xx    xx 
7.5 xx  xx  x x  xxxx  xxx  xx  x 
7.6 x    x  xxx  xx   x 
7.7    x x   xx  xx  x 
7.8 x  x     xxx  xx   
7.9  x xx x           
8.0     x  x  x      
8.1  xx      x     
8.2    x       
8.3         x 
8.4         
8.5         x 
8.6         
8.7         
8.8         
8.9         
9.0         
 
* Regions investigated are: (A) - Western Pacific; (B) - West of New Guinea; (C) - 
Western New Guinea; (D) - Eastern New Guinea; (E) - Western Solomons; (F) - Eastern 
Solomons; (G) - Santa Cruz; and (H) - Tonga/Samoa.  Grids used to search the on-line 
U.S. Geological Survey/National Earthquake Information Center data bases will be 
provided upon request.   
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